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Nuclear Lessons for Cyber Security? 
Joseph S. Nye Jr. 
Identifying “revolutions in military afairs” is arbitrary, but some 
inlection points in technological change are larger than others: for example, 
the gunpowder revolution in early modern Europe, the industrial revolu­
tion of the nineteenth century, the second industrial revolution of the 
early twentieth century, and the nuclear revolution in the middle of the 
last century.1 In this century, we can add the information revolution that 
has produced today’s extremely rapid growth of cyberspace. Earlier revolu­
tions in information technology, such as Gutenberg’s printing press, also 
had profound political efects, but the current revolution can be traced 
to Moore’s law and the thousand-fold decrease in the costs of computing 
power that occurred in the last quarter of the twentieth century. 
Political leaders and analysts are only beginning to come to terms with 
this transformative technology. Until now, the issue of cyber security has 
largely been the domain of computer experts and specialists. When the 
Internet was created 40 years ago, this small community was like a vir­
tual village of people who knew each other, and they designed an open 
system with little attention to security. While the Internet is not new, the 
commercial Web is less than two decades old, and it has exploded from a 
few million users in the early 1990s to some two billion users today. his 
burgeoning interdependence has created great opportunities and great 
vulnerabilities, which strategists do not yet fully comprehend. As Gen 
Michael Hayden, former director of the CIA says, “Rarely has something 
been so important and so talked about with less clarity and less apparent 
understanding [than cyber security]. . . . I have sat in very small group 
meetings in Washington . . . unable (along with my colleagues) to decide 
on a course of action because we lacked a clear picture of the long-term 
legal and policy implications of any decision we might make.”2 
Joseph S. Nye Jr. is the University Distinguished Service Professor and former dean of Harvard’s Kennedy 
School of Government. He received his bachelor’s degree summa cum laude from Princeton, attended Oxford 
University as a Rhodes Scholar, and earned a PhD in political science from Harvard. He has served as assistant 
secretary of defense for international security afairs, chair of the National Intelligence Council, and a deputy 
undersecretary of state. He is best known for developing and expounding on the term soft power in a number 
of articles and books. 
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Nuclear Lessons for Cyber Security? 
Governments learn slowly from knowledge, study, and experience, and 
learning occurs internationally when new knowledge gradually redeines 
the content of national interests and leads to new policies.3 For example, 
the United States and the Soviet Union took decades to learn how to 
adapt and respond to the prior revolution in military afairs—nuclear 
technology after 1945. As we try to make sense of our halting responses to 
the current cyber revolution, are there any lessons we can learn from our 
responses to the prior technological transformation? In comparison to the 
nuclear revolution in military afairs, strategic studies of the cyber domain 
are chronologically equivalent to 1960 but conceptually more equivalent 
to 1950. Analysts are still not clear about the lessons of ofense, defense, 
deterrence, escalation, norms, arms control, or how they it together into 
a national strategy. After a short overview of the problem of cyber security 
in the next section, I will suggest several general lessons and then discuss 
a number of international lessons that can be learned from the nuclear 
experience. While the two technologies are vastly diferent, as I will argue 
below, there are nonetheless useful comparisons one can make of the ways 
in which governments learn to respond to technological revolutions. 
Cyberspace in Perspective 
Cyber is a preix standing for computer and electromagnetic spectrum– 
related activities. he cyber domain includes the Internet of networked 
computers but also intranets, cellular technologies, iber-optic cables, and 
space-based communications. Cyberspace has a physical infrastructure 
layer that follows the economic laws of rival resources and the political 
laws of sovereign jurisdiction and control. his aspect of the Internet is 
not a traditional “commons.” It also has a virtual or informational layer 
with increasing economic returns to scale and political practices that 
make  jurisdictional  control  diicult.  Attacks  from  the  informational 
realm, where costs are low, can be launched against the physical domain, 
where resources are scarce and expensive. Conversely, control of the 
physical layer can have both territorial and extraterritorial efects on the 
informational layer. Cyber power can produce preferred outcomes within 
cyberspace or in other domains outside cyberspace. By analogy, sea power 
refers to the use of resources in the oceans domain to win naval battles on 
the oceans, but it also includes the ability to use the oceans to inluence 
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Joseph S. Nye Jr. 
battles, commerce, and opinions on land. Likewise, the same analogy can 
be applied to airpower. 
he cyber domain is a complex man-made environment. Unlike atoms, 
human adversaries are purposeful and intelligent. Mountains and oceans 
are hard to move, but portions of cyberspace can be turned on and of by 
throwing a switch. It is cheaper and quicker to move electrons across the 
globe than to move large ships long distances through the friction of salt 
water. he costs of developing multiple carrier task forces and submarine 
leets create enormous barriers to entry and make it possible to speak of 
American naval dominance. In contrast, the barriers to entry in the cyber 
domain are so low that nonstate actors and small states can play signiicant 
roles at low cost. 
he Future of Power describes difusion of power away from governments 
as one of the great power shifts of this century.4 Cyberspace is a perfect 
example of this broader trend. he largest powers are unlikely to be able to 
dominate this domain as much as they have others like sea, air, or space. 
While they have greater resources, they also have greater vulnerabilities, 
and at this stage in the development of the technology, ofense domi­
nates defense in cyberspace. he United States, Russia, Britain, France, 
and China have greater capacity than other state and nonstate actors, but 
it makes little sense to speak of dominance in cyberspace. If anything, de­
pendence on complex cyber systems for support of military and economic 
activities creates new vulnerabilities in large states that can be exploited by 
nonstate actors. Four decades ago, the Pentagon created the Internet, and 
today, by most accounts, the United States remains the leading country 
in both its military and societal use. At the same time, however, because 
of greater dependence on networked computers and communication, the 
United States is more vulnerable to attack than many other countries, and 
the cyber domain has become a major source of insecurity.5 
he term cyber attack covers a wide variety of actions ranging from simple 
probes, to defacing websites, to denial of service, to espionage and destruction.6 
Similarly, the term cyber war is used very loosely for a wide range of behav­
iors. In this, it relects dictionary deinitions of war that range from armed 
conlict to any hostile contention (e.g., “war between the sexes” or “war 
on poverty”). At the other extreme, some use a very narrow deinition of 
cyber war as a “bloodless war” among states that consists only of conlict 
in the virtual layer of cyberspace. But this avoids important issues of the 
interconnection of the physical and virtual layers of cyberspace discussed 
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Nuclear Lessons for Cyber Security? 
above. A more useful deinition of cyber war is, hostile actions in cyberspace 
that have efects that amplify or are equivalent to major kinetic violence. 
In the physical world, governments have a near monopoly on large-scale 
use of force, the defender has an intimate knowledge of the terrain, and at­
tacks end because of attrition or exhaustion. Both resources and mobility 
are costly. In the virtual world, actors are diverse, sometimes anonymous, 
physical distance is immaterial, and ofense is often cheap. Because the 
Internet was designed for ease of use rather than security, the ofense cur­
rently has the advantage over the defense. his might not remain the case 
in the long term as technology evolves, including eforts at “reengineer­
ing” some systems for greater security, but it remains the case at this stage. 
he larger party has limited ability to disarm or destroy the enemy, occupy 
territory, or efectively use counterforce strategies. Cyber war, although 
only incipient at this stage, is the most dramatic of the potential threats. 
Major states with elaborate technical and human resources could, in prin­
ciple, create massive disruption as well as physical destruction through 
cyber attacks on military as well as civilian targets. Responses to cyber war 
include a form of interstate deterrence (though diferent from classical 
nuclear deterrence), ofensive capabilities, and designs for network and 
infrastructure resilience if deterrence fails. At some point in the future, it 
may be possible to reinforce these steps with certain rudimentary norms, 
but the world is at an early stage in such a process. 
If one treats hacktivism as mostly a disruptive nuisance at this stage, 
there remain four major categories of cyber threats to national security, 
each with a diferent time horizon and diferent (in principle) solutions: 
cyber war and economic espionage are largely associated with states, and 
cyber crime and cyber terrorism are mostly associated with nonstate actors. 
For the United States, at the present time, the highest costs come from 
espionage and crime, but over the next decade or so, war and terrorism 
may become greater threats than they are today. Moreover, as alliances and 
tactics evolve among diferent actors, the categories may increasingly over­
lap. In the view of ADM Mike McConnell, “Sooner or later, terror groups 
will achieve cyber-sophistication. It’s like nuclear proliferation, only far 
easier.”7 We are only just beginning to see glimpses of cyber war—for in­
stance, as an adjunct in some conventional attacks, in the denial-of-service 
attacks that accompanied the conventional war in Georgia in 2008, or 
the recent sabotage of Iranian centrifuges by the Stuxnet worm. Deputy 
Defense Secretary William Lynn has described the evolution of cyber 
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Joseph S. Nye Jr. 
attacks from exploitation, to disruption of networks, to destruction of 
physical facilities. He argues that while states have the greatest capabilities, 
nonstate actors are more likely to initiate a catastrophic attack.8 A “cyber 
9/11” may be more likely than the often mentioned “cyber Pearl Harbor.” 
Nuclear Lessons for Cyber Security? 
Can the nuclear revolution in military afairs seven decades ago teach 
us anything about the current cyber transformation? At irst glance, the 
answer seems to be no. he diferences between the technologies are just 
too great. he National Research Council cites diferences in the threshold 
for action and attribution—nuclear explosions are unambiguous, while 
cyber intrusions that plant logic bombs in the infrastructure may go un­
noticed for long periods before being used and, even then, can be dii­
cult to trace.9 Even more dramatic is the sheer destructiveness of nuclear 
technology. Unlike nuclear, cyber does not pose an existential threat. As 
Martin Libicki points out, destruction or disconnection of cyber systems 
could return us to the economy of the 1990s—a huge loss of GDP—but 
a major nuclear war could return us to the Stone Age.10 In that and other 
dimensions, comparisons of cyber with biological and chemical weaponry 
might be more apt. 
Moreover, cyber destruction can be disaggregated, and small doses of 
destruction can be administered over time. While there are many degrees 
of nuclear destruction, all are above a dramatic threshold or irebreak. In 
addition, while there is an overlap of civilian and military nuclear technology, 
nuclear originated in war, and the diferences in its use are clearer than in 
cyber where the Web has burgeoned in the civilian sector. For example, 
the “dot mil” domain name is only a small part of the Internet, and 90 
percent of military telephone and Internet communications travel over 
civilian networks. Finally, because of the commercial predominance and 
low costs, the barriers to entry to cyber are much lower for nonstate actors. 
While nuclear terrorism is a serious concern, the barriers for nonstate actors 
gaining access to nuclear materials remain steep; renting a botnet to wreak 
destruction on the Internet is both easy and cheap. 
It would be a mistake, however, to neglect the past, so long as we 
remember  that  metaphors  and  analogies  are  always  imperfect.11  In 
words often attributed to Mark Twain, “History never repeats itself, but 
sometimes it rhymes.” here are some important nuclear-cyber strategic 
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Nuclear Lessons for Cyber Security? 
rhymes, such as the superiority of ofense over defense, the potential use 
of weapons for both tactical and strategic purposes, the possibility of irst- 
and second-use scenarios, the possibility of creating automated responses 
when time is short, the likelihood of unintended consequences and cas­
cading efects when a technology is new and poorly understood, and the 
belief that new weapons are “equalizers” that allow smaller actors to compete 
directly but asymmetrically with a larger state.12 
Even more important than these technical and political similarities is 
the learning experience as governments and private actors try to under­
stand a transformative technology—and adopt strategies to cope with it. 
While government reports warning about computer and Internet vulner­
ability date back to 1991 and the Pentagon recently released a new strategy, 
few observers would argue that the country has developed an adequate 
national strategy for cyber security. It is worth examining the uneven and 
halting history of nuclear learning to alert us to some of the pitfalls and 
opportunities ahead in the cyber domain. Ernest May once described US 
defense policy and the development of nuclear strategy in the irst half-
decade following World War II as “chaotic.”13 He would likely apply the 
same term to the situation in cyberspace today. 
Some General Lessons 
Expect continuing technological change to complicate early eforts 
at strategy. At the beginning, both issile materials and atomic bombs were 
assumed to be scarce, and it was considered wasteful to use atomic bombs 
against any but countervalue targets—that is, cities. Bernard Brodie and 
others concluded in the important 1946 book he Absolute Weapon that 
superiority in numbers would not guarantee strategic superiority, deter­
rence of war was the only rational military policy, and ensuring survival of 
the retaliatory arsenal was crucial.14 hese postulates of “inite” or “existen­
tial” deterrence persisted throughout the Cold War and serve as the basis 
for the nuclear strategies of countries such as France and China to this day. 
In the bipolar competition of the Cold War, however, the strategy of inite 
deterrence was challenged by the development of the hydrogen bomb in 
the early 1950s. Destructive power was no longer scarce but now unlimited. 
While hydrogen bombs could lead to explosions counted in the tens of 
megatons, their real revolutionary efect was to permit miniaturization, 
which allowed multiple weapons to pack huge destructive power into the 
nose cones of another technological surprise––intercontinental ballistic 
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Joseph S. Nye Jr. 
missiles––which shortened response times to less than an hour. his bur­
geoning explosive power produced great concern about the vulnerability 
of limited arsenals, an enormous increase in the number of weapons, 
diminished prospects for active defenses, and the development of elabo­
rate counterforce war-ighting strategies. 
Both  superpowers  had  to  confront  the  “usability  paradox.”  If  the 
weapons could not be used, they could not deter. he United States and 
the USSR were locked in a positive-sum game that involved avoiding 
nuclear war, but simultaneously they were locked in a zero-sum game 
of political competition. In the game of political chicken, perceptions of 
credibility became crucial. Some prospect of usability had to be intro­
duced into doctrine, and for decades strategists wrestled with issues of 
counterforce targeting, exploring strategic defense technology, and the 
issues of perception that disparities in large numbers might create for 
extended deterrence. Elaborate war-ighting schemes and escalation lad­
ders were invented by a nuclear priesthood of experts who specialized in 
arcane and abstract formulas. In 1976, Paul Nitze and the Committee on 
the Present Danger expressed alarm about American weakness when the 
United States possessed tens of thousands of weapons, and in 1979, even 
Henry Kissinger predicted that because of American nuclear weakness, 
Soviet risk-taking “must exponentially increase.”15  In fact, the opposite 
proved to be the case. While politicians and strategists assailed the idea of 
mutual assured destruction as an immoral and dangerous strategy, MAD 
turned out to be a fact, not a policy. As McGeorge Bundy noted in his 
inal work, when it came to the Cuban missile crisis, existential deterrence 
worked, and a few Soviet bombs created deterrence despite an over­
whelming American superiority in numbers.16 
Looking at today’s cyber domain, interdependence and vulnerability are 
twin facts that are likely to persist, but we should expect further technological 
change to complicate early strategies. ARPANET was created in 1969, 
and the domain name system and the irst viruses date back to 1983; 
however, as noted above, the mass use and commercial development of 
cyberspace date only from the invention of the Worldwide Web in 1989 
and widely available browsers in the mid-1990s.17 As one expert put it, 
“As recently as the mid-1990s, the Internet was still essentially a research 
tool and the plaything of a few.”18 In other words, the massive vulner­
abilities that have created the security problems we face today are less than 
two decades old and are likely to increase. While some experts talk about 
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Nuclear Lessons for Cyber Security? 
reducing vulnerability by reengineering the Internet to make attribution 
of attack easier, this will take time. Even more important, it will not close 
all vectors of attack. 
Early strategies focused on the network: improving code, computer 
hygiene, addressing issues of attribution, and maintaining air gaps for the 
most sensitive systems. hese steps remain important components of a 
strategy, but they are far from suicient. In some ways, the invention and 
explosion in the usage of the Web is analogous to the hydrogen revolution 
in the nuclear era. By leading society and the economy to a vast depen­
dence on networked communications, it created enormous vulnerabilities 
that could be exploited not only through the Internet but also through 
supply chains, devices to bridge air gaps, human agents, and manipulation 
of social networks.19 With the development of mobility, cloud comput­
ing, and the importance of a limited number of large providers, the issues 
of vulnerability may change again. Given such technological volatility, a cyber 
security strategy will have to be multifaceted and capable of continual 
adaptation. It should increase the ratio of work that an attacker must do 
compared to that of a defender and include redundancy and resilience to 
allow graceful degradation of complex systems so that inevitable failures 
are not catastrophic.20 Strategists need to be alert to the fact that today’s 
solutions may not suice tomorrow. 
Strategy for a new technology will lack adequate empirical content. 
Since Nagasaki, no one has seen a nuclear weapon used in war. As Alain 
Enthoven, one of Robert McNamara’s “whiz kids” of the early 1960s, re­
torted during a Pentagon argument about war plans, “General, I have fought 
just as many nuclear wars as you have.”21 With little empirical grounding, 
it was diicult to set limits or test strategic formulations. Elaborate con­
structs and prevailing political fashion led to expensive conclusions based 
on abstract formulas and relatively little evidence. Fred Kaplan described 
the environment thusly: 
he method of mathematical calculation, driven mainly from the theory of eco­
nomics that they had all studied, gave the strategists of the new age a handle on 
the colossally destructive power of the weapons they found in their midst. But 
over the years the method became a catechism. . . . he precise calculations and 
the cool, comfortable vocabulary were coming all too commonly to be grasped 
not merely as tools of desperation but as genuine relections of the nature of 
nuclear war.22 
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In the absence of empirical evidence, these nuclear theologians were able 
to spend vast resources on their hypothetical scenarios. 
Cyber has the advantage that with widespread attacks by hackers, criminals, 
and spies, there is more cumulative evidence of a variety of attack mecha­
nisms and of the strengths and weaknesses of various responses to such 
attacks. It helps that cyber destruction can be disaggregated in a way that 
nuclear cannot. But at the same time, no one has yet seen a cyber war, in 
the strict sense of the word, as deined above. Denial-of-service attacks in 
Estonia and Georgia and industrial sabotage such as Stuxnet in Iran give 
some inklings of the auxiliary use of cyber attacks, but they do not test 
the full set of actions and reactions in a cyber war between states. he US 
government has conducted a number of war games and simulations and 
is developing a cyber test range, but the problems of unintended conse­
quences and cascading efects have not been experienced. he problems 
of escalation as well as the implications for the important doctrines of dis­
crimination and proportionality under the Law of Armed Conlict remain 
unknown. 
New technologies raise new issues in civil-military relations. Difer­
ent parts of complex institutions like governments learn diferent lessons 
at diferent paces, and new technologies set of competition among bu­
reaucracies. At the beginning of the nuclear era, political leaders developed 
institutions to maintain civilian control over the new technology, creating 
an Atomic Energy Agency separate from the military as a means of ensur­
ing civilian control. Congress established a Joint Atomic Energy Committee. 
But gaps still developed in the relationship between civilians and the mili­
tary. Operational control of deployed nuclear weapons came under the 
Strategic Air Command, which had its own traditions, standard operat­
ing procedures, and a strong leader, Curtis LeMay. In 1957, LeMay told 
Robert Sprague, the deputy director of the civilian Gaither Committee 
that was investigating the vulnerability of American nuclear forces, that 
he was not too concerned because “if I see that the Russians are amassing 
their planes for an attack, I’m going to knock the s**t out of them before 
they take of the ground.” Sprague was thunderstruck and replied, “But 
General LeMay, that is not national policy,” to which LeMay replied, “I 
don’t care. It’s my policy. hat’s what I’m going to do.”23 In 1960, when 
President Eisenhower ordered the development of a single integrated 
operational plan (SIOP-62), SAC produced a plan for a massive strike with 
2,164 megatons that targeted China as well as the Soviet Union because of 
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Nuclear Lessons for Cyber Security? 
the “Sino-Soviet Bloc.”24 he limited nuclear options that civilian strategists 
theorized about as part of a bargaining process would not have looked very 
limited from the point of view of the Soviet bargaining partner—not to 
mention China. 
While Cyber Command is still new and has very diferent leadership 
from the old Strategic Air Command, cyber security does present some 
similar problems of relating civilian control to military operations. Time 
is even shorter. Rather than the 30 minutes of nuclear warning and pos­
sible launch under attack, today there would be 300 milliseconds between 
a computer detecting that it was about to be attacked by hostile malware 
and a preemptive response to disarm the attack. his requires not only 
advanced knowledge of malware being developed in potentially hostile 
systems but also an automated response. What happens to the human 
factor in the decision loop? Obviously, there is no time to go up the chain 
of command, much less convene a deputies’ meeting at the White House. 
For active defense to be efective, authority will have to be delegated under 
carefully thought-out rules of engagement developed in advance. More­
over, there are important questions about when active defense shades into 
retaliation or ofense. As the head of Cyber Command has testiied, such 
legal authorities and rules still remain to be fully resolved.25 
Civilian uses will complicate efective national security strategies. 
Nuclear energy was irst harnessed for military purposes, but it was quickly 
seen as having important civilian uses as well. In the early days of the de­
velopment of nuclear energy, it was claimed that electricity would become 
“too cheap to meter” and cars would be fueled for a year by an atomic 
pellet the size of a vitamin pill.26 he engineers’ optimism about their new 
technology was reinforced by a political desire to promote the civilian uses 
of nuclear energy. Fearful that antiwar and antinuclear movements would 
delegitimize nuclear weapons and thus reduce their deterrent value, the 
Eisenhower administration promoted an Atoms for Peace program that 
ofered to assist in the promotion of nuclear energy worldwide. Other 
countries joined in. he net efect was to create a powerful domestic and 
transnational lobby for promotion of nuclear energy that helped provide 
India with the materials needed for its nuclear explosion in 1974 and jus­
tiied the French sale of a reprocessing plant to Pakistan and a German sale 
of enrichment technology to Brazil in the mid-1970s. 
he Atomic Energy Commission and the Joint Atomic Energy Com­
mittee had been created to assure civilian control of nuclear technology, 
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Joseph S. Nye Jr. 
but over time both institutions became examples of regulatory capture 
by powerful commercial interests—more interested in promotion than 
regulation and security. Late in the Ford administration, both institutions 
were disbanded. However, after the oil crisis of 1974, it became an article 
of faith that nuclear would be the energy of the future; that uranium 
would be scarce, and thus widespread use of plutonium and breeder 
reactors would be necessary. When the Carter administration, following 
the recommendations of the nongovernmental Ford-Mitre Report,27 tried 
to slow the development of this plutonium economy in 1977, it ran into a 
buzz saw of reaction not only overseas but also from the nuclear industry 
and its congressional allies at home. 
As mentioned earlier, the civilian sector plays an even larger role in the 
cyber domain, and this enormously complicates the problem of develop­
ing a national security strategy. he Internet has become a much more 
signiicant contributor to GDP than nuclear energy ever was. he private 
sector is more than a constraint on policy; it is at the heart of the activity 
that policy is designed to protect. Risk is inevitable, and redundancy and 
resilience after attack must be built into a strategy. Most of the Internet 
and its infrastructure belong to the private sector, and the government has 
only modest levers to use. Proposals to create a central agency in the execu­
tive branch and a joint committee on cyber security in Congress might be 
useful, but one should be alert to the dangers of regulatory capture and 
the development of a cyber “iron triangle” of executive branch, congres­
sional, and industry partners. 
From a security perspective, there is a misalignment of economic incen­
tives in the cyber domain.28 Firms have an incentive to provide for their 
own security up to a point, but competitive pricing of products limits that 
point. Moreover, irms have a inancial incentive not to disclose intru­
sions that could undercut public conidence in their products and stock 
prices. A McAfee white paper notes, “he public (and very often the in­
dustry) understanding of this signiicant national security threat is largely 
minimal due to the very limited number of voluntary disclosures by vic­
tims of intrusion activity.”29 he result is a paucity of reliable data and an 
underinvestment  in  security  from  the  national  perspective.  Moreover, 
laws designed to ensure competition restrict cooperation among private 
irms, and the diiculty of ascertaining liability in complex software limits 
the role of the insurance market. Public-private partnerships are limited 
by diferent perspectives and mistrust. As one participant at a recent cyber 
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Nuclear Lessons for Cyber Security? 
security conference concluded, something bad will have to happen before 
markets begin to reprice security.30 
International Cooperation Lessons 
Learning can lead to concurrence in beliefs without cooperation. 
Governments act in accordance with their national interests, but they can 
change how they deine their interests, both through adjusting their 
behavior to changes in the structure of a situation as well as through 
transnational and international contacts and cooperation. In the nuclear 
domain, the initial learning led to concurrence of beliefs before it led to 
contacts and cooperation. he irst efort at arms control, the Baruch Plan 
of 1946, was rejected out of hand by the Soviet Union as a ploy to preserve 
the American monopoly, and the early learning was unilateral on both sides. 
As we have seen, much of what passed for nuclear knowledge in the early 
days was abstraction based on assumptions about rational actors, which 
made it diicult for new information to alter prior beliefs. Yet gradually, 
both sides became increasingly aware of the unprecedented destructive 
power of nuclear weapons through weapons tests and modeling, particu­
larly after the invention of the hydrogen bomb. As Winston Churchill put 
it in 1955, “he atomic bomb, with all its terrors, did not carry us outside 
the scope of human control,” but with the H-bomb, “the entire foundation 
of human afairs was revolutionized.”31 In his memorable phrase, “Safety 
will be the sturdy child of terror.” On the other side of the Iron Curtain, 
Nikita Khrushchev recalled: “When I was appointed First Secretary of 
the Central Committee and learned all the facts about nuclear power I 
couldn’t sleep for several days. hen I became convinced that we could 
never possibly use these weapons, and I was able to sleep again. But all the 
same we must be prepared.”32 hese parallel lessons were learned indepen­
dently. It was not until 1985 that Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev 
inally declared jointly that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never 
be fought.” hat crucial nuclear taboo has existed for nearly seven decades 
and was well ensconced before it was jointly pronounced. 
A second area where concurrence in beliefs developed was in the com­
mand and control of weapons and the dangers of escalation as the two 
governments accumulated experience of false alarms and accidents. A 
third area related to the spread of nuclear weapons. Both the United States 
and the Soviet Union gradually realized that sharing nuclear technology 
and expecting that exports could remain purely peaceful was implausible. 
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A fourth area of common knowledge concerned the volatility of the arms 
race and the expenses and risks that it entailed. hese views developed in­
dependently and in parallel, and it was more than two decades before they 
led to formal cooperation. Perfect concurrence of beliefs would lead to 
harmony, which is very rare in world politics. Cooperation in the nuclear 
area responded to both some concurrence of beliefs as well as actual and 
anticipated discord.33 
By its very nature, the interconnected cyber domain requires a degree 
of cooperation and governments becoming aware of this situation. Some 
analysts see cyberspace as analogous to the ungoverned Wild West, but 
unlike the early days of the nuclear domain, cyberspace has a number of 
areas of private and public governance. Certain technical standards related 
to Internet protocol are set (or not) by consensus among engineers in­
volved in the nongovernmental Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), 
and the domain name system is managed by the Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). he United Nations and the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) have tried to promulgate 
some general norms, though with limited success. National governments 
control copyright and intellectual property laws and try to manage prob­
lems of security, espionage, and crime within national policies. hough 
some cooperative frameworks exist, such as the European Convention on 
Cyber Crime, they remain weak, and states still focus on the zero-sum 
rather than positive-sum aspect of these games. At the same time, a de­
gree of independent learning may be occurring on some of these issues. 
For example, Russia and China have refused to sign the Convention on 
Cyber Crime and have hidden behind plausible deniability as they have 
encouraged intrusions by “patriotic hackers.” heir attitudes may change, 
however, if costs exceed beneits. For example, “Russian cyber-criminals 
no longer follow hands-of rules when it comes to motherland targets, and 
Russian authorities are beginning to drop the laissez-faire policy.”34 And 
China is independently experiencing increased costs from cyber crime. As 
in the nuclear domain, independent learning may pave the way for active 
cooperation later. 
Learning is often lumpy and discontinuous. Large groups and orga­
nizations often learn by crises and major events that serve as metaphors for 
organizing and dramatizing diverse sets of experiences. he Berlin crises 
and particularly the Cuban missile crisis of the early 1960s played such 
a role. Having come close to the precipice of war, both Kennedy and 
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Nuclear Lessons for Cyber Security? 
Khrushchev drew lessons about cooperation. It was shortly after the Cuban 
missile crisis that Kennedy gave his American University speech that laid 
the basis for the atmospheric test ban discussions. 
Of course crises are not the only way to learn. he experience of playing 
iterated games of prisoner’s dilemma in situations with a long shadow of 
the future may lead players to learn the value of cooperation in maximizing 
their payofs over time.35 Early steps in cooperation in the nuclear domain 
encouraged later steps, without requiring a change in the competitive 
nature of the overall relationship. hese governmental steps were rein­
forced by informal “Track Two” dialogues such as the Pugwash Conferences. 
hus far there have been no major crises in the cyber domain, though 
the denial-of-service attacks on Estonia and Georgia and the Stuxnet at­
tack on Iran give hints of what might come. As mentioned earlier, some 
experts think that markets will not price security properly in the private 
sector until there is some form of visible crisis. But other forms of learning 
can occur. For example in the area of industrial espionage, China has had 
few incentives to restrict its behavior because the beneits far exceed the 
costs. Spying is as old as human history and does not violate any explicit 
provisions of international law. Nevertheless, at times governments have 
established rules of the road for limiting espionage and engaged in pat­
terns of tit-for-tat retaliation to create an incentive for cooperation. While 
it is diicult to envisage enforceable treaties in which governments agree 
not to engage in espionage, it is plausible to imagine a process of iterations 
(tit for tat) which develops rules of the road that could limit damage in 
practical terms. To avoid “defection lock-in,” which leads to unwanted 
escalation, it helps to engage in discussions that can develop common per­
ceptions about redlines, if not fully agreed norms, as gradually developed 
in the nuclear domain after the Cuban missile crisis.36 Discussion helps to 
provide a broader context (a “shadow of the future”) for speciic diferences, 
and it is interesting to note that China and the United States have begun 
to discuss cyber issues in the context of their broad annual Strategic and 
Economic Dialogue, as well as in informal Track Two settings. 
Learning occurs at diferent rates in diferent issues of a new do­
main. While the US-Soviet political and ideological competition limited 
their cooperation in some areas, awareness of nuclear destructiveness led 
them to avoid war with each other and to develop what Zbigniew Brzezinski 
called “a code of conduct of reciprocal behavior guiding the competition, 
lessening the danger that it could become lethal.”37 hese basic rules of 
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prudence included no direct ighting, no nuclear use, and communica­
tion during crisis. More speciically, it meant the division of Germany and 
respect for spheres of inluence in Europe in the 1950s and early 1960s 
and a compromise on Cuba. On the issue of command and control, con­
cerns about crisis management and accidents led to the hotline, as well as 
the Accidents Measures and Incidents at Sea meetings of the early 1970s. 
Similarly, on the issue of nonproliferation the two sides discovered a com­
mon interest and began to cooperate in the mid-1960s, well before the 
bilateral arms control agreements about issues of arms race stability in the 
1970s. Unlike the view that says nothing is settled in a deal until every­
thing is settled, nuclear learning and agreements proceeded at diferent 
rates in diferent areas. 
he cyber domain is likely to be analogous. As we have seen, there 
are already some agreements and institutions that relate to the basic 
functioning of the Internet, such as technical standards as well as names 
and addresses, and there is the beginning of a normative framework for 
cyber crime. But it is likely to take longer before there are agreements on 
contentious issues such as cyber intrusions for purposes like espionage and 
preparing the battleield. Nevertheless, the inability to envisage an overall 
agreement need not prevent progress on sub-issues. Indeed, the best pros­
pects for success may involve disaggregating the term attacks into speciic 
actions that could be addressed separately. 
Involve the military in international contacts. As mentioned above, 
the military can be under civilian control but still have an independent 
operational culture of its own. By its nature and function, it is charged 
with entertaining worst-case assumptions. It does not necessarily learn 
the same lessons at the same rate as its civilian counterparts. Early in the 
SALT talks, Soviet military leaders complained about the American habit 
of discussing sensitive military information in front of civilian members of 
the Soviet delegation. he practice had the efect of broadening communi­
cation within the Soviet side. At the same time, Soviet military leaders had 
little understanding of American institutions or the role of Congress and 
how that would afect nuclear issues. heir involvement in arms talks helped 
to produce a more sophisticated generation of younger leaders. As Foreign 
Minister Andrei Gromyko put it, “It’s hard to discuss the subject with the 
military, but the more contact they have with the Americans, the easier it 
will be to turn our soldiers into something more than just martinets.”38 
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Nuclear Lessons for Cyber Security? 
In the cyber domain, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army plays a 
major role in recruitment, training, and operations. China today provides 
more opportunities for PLA generals to have international contacts than 
was true for Soviet oicers during the Cold War, but those contacts are 
still limited. Moreover, while political control over the Chinese military 
is strong, operational control is weak, as shown by a number of recent 
incidents. Indeed, seven of the nine members of the Standing Military 
Commission wear uniforms, and there is no National Security Council or 
equivalent to coordinate operational details across the government. he 
lessons from the nuclear era would suggest the importance of involving 
PLA oicers in discussions of cyber cooperation. 
Deterrence is complex and involves more than just retaliation. Early 
views of deterrence in the nuclear era were relatively simple and relied on 
massive retaliation to a nuclear attack. Retaliation remained at the core 
of deterrence throughout the Cold War, but as strategists confronted the 
usability dilemma and the problems of extended deterrence, their theories 
of deterrence became more complex. While a second-strike capability and 
mutual assured destruction may have been enough to prevent attacks on 
the homeland, they were never credible for issues at the low end of the 
spectrum of interests. Somewhere between these extremes lay extended 
deterrence of attacks against allies and defense of vulnerable positions 
such as Berlin. Nuclear deterrence was supplemented by other measures, 
such as forward basing of conventional forces, declaratory policy, changes 
of alert levels, and force movements. 
Many analysts argue that deterrence does not work in cyberspace be­
cause of the problem of attribution, but that is also too simple. Interstate 
deterrence through entanglement and denial still exists even when there is 
inadequate attribution. Even when the source of an attack can be success­
fully disguised under a “false lag,” other governments may ind themselves 
suiciently entangled in symmetrically interdependent relationships that 
a major attack would be counterproductive—witness the reluctance of the 
Chinese government to dump dollars to punish the United States after it 
sold arms to Taiwan in 2010.39 Unlike the single strand of military inter­
dependence that linked the United States and the Soviet Union during 
the Cold War, the United States, China, and other countries are entangled 
in multiple networks. China, for example, would itself lose from an attack 
that severely damaged the American economy, and vice versa. 
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In addition, an unknown attacker may be deterred by denial. If irewalls 
are strong or the prospect of a self-enforcing response (“an electric fence”) 
seems possible, attack becomes less attractive. Ofensive capabilities for 
immediate response can create an active defense that can serve as a deter­
rent even when the identity of the attacker is not fully known. Futility 
can also help deter an unknown attacker. If the target is well protected or 
redundancy and resilience allow quick recovery, the risk-to-beneit ratio in 
attack is diminished.40 Moreover, attribution does not have to be perfect, 
and to the extent that false lags are imperfect and rumors of the source of 
an attack are widely deemed credible (though not probative in a court of 
law), reputational damage to an attacker’s soft power may contribute to 
deterrence. Finally, a reputation for ofensive capability and a declaratory 
policy that keeps open the means of retaliation can help to reinforce de­
terrence. Of course, nonstate actors are harder to deter, and improved de­
fenses such as preemption and human intelligence become important in 
such cases. But among states, nuclear deterrence was more complex than 
it irst looked, and that is doubly true of deterrence in the cyber domain. 
Begin arms control with positive-sum games related to third parties. 
Although the United States and the Soviet Union developed some tacit 
rules of the road about prudent behavior early on, direct negotiation and 
agreements concerning arms race stability or force structure did not occur 
until the third decade of the nuclear era. Early eforts at comprehensive 
arms control like the Baruch Plan were total nonstarters. And even the 
eventual SALT agreements were of limited value in controlling numbers 
of weapons and involved elaborate veriication procedures which them­
selves sometimes became issues of contention. he irst formal agreement 
was the Limited Test Ban Treaty, where detection of atmospheric tests was 
easily veriiable and it could be considered largely an environmental treaty. 
he second major agreement was the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, 
which was aimed at limiting the spread of nuclear weapons to third parties. 
Both these agreements involved positive-sum games. 
In the cyber domain, the global nature of the Internet requires international 
cooperation. Some people call for cyber arms control negotiations and 
formal treaties, but diferences in cultural norms and the impossibility of 
veriication make such treaties diicult to negotiate or implement. Such 
eforts could actually reduce national security if asymmetrical implemen­
tation put legalistic cultures like the United States at a disadvantage com­
pared to societies with a higher degree of government corruption. At the 
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Nuclear Lessons for Cyber Security? 
same time, it is not too early to explore international talks and coopera­
tion. he most promising early areas for international cooperation are not 
bilateral conlicts, but problems posed by third parties such as criminals 
and terrorists. 
For more than a decade, Russia has sought a treaty for broad international 
oversight of the Internet and “information security” banning deception or 
the embedding of malicious code or circuitry that could be activated in 
the event of war. But Americans have argued that arms control measures 
banning ofense can damage defense against current attacks and would 
be impossible to verify or enforce. And declaratory statements of “no irst 
use” might have restraining efects on legalistic cultures like the United 
States while having less efect on states with closed societies. Moreover, 
the United States has resisted agreements that could legitimize authoritarian 
governments’ censorship of the Internet. Cultural diferences present a 
diiculty in reaching any broad agreements on regulating content on the 
Internet. he United States has called for the creation of “norms of be­
havior among states” that “encourage respect for the global networked 
commons,” but as Jack Goldsmith has argued, “Even if we could stop 
all cyber attacks from our soil, we wouldn’t want to. On the private side, 
hacktivism can be a tool of liberation. On the public side, the best de­
fense of critical computer systems is sometimes a good ofense.”41 From 
the American point of view, Twitter and YouTube are matters of personal 
freedom; seen from Beijing or Tehran, they are instruments of attack. Try­
ing to limit all intrusions would be impossible, but on the spectrum of 
attacks ranging from soft hacktivism to hard implanting of logic bombs 
in SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) systems, one could 
start with cyber crime and cyber terrorism involving nonstate third parties 
where major states would have an interest in limiting damage by agreeing 
to cooperate on forensics and controls. States might start with acceptance 
of responsibility for attacks that traverse their territory and a duty to co­
operate on forensics, information, and remedial measures.42 At some later 
points, it is possible that such cooperation could spread to state activities 
at the hard end of the spectrum, as it did in the nuclear domain. 
Conclusion 
Historical analogies are always dangerous if taken too literally, and the 
diferences between nuclear and cyber technologies are great. he cyber 
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domain is new and dynamic, but so was nuclear technology at its incep­
tion. It may help to put the problems of designing a strategy for cyber 
security into perspective, particularly the aspect of cooperation among 
states, if we realize how long and diicult it was to develop a nuclear 
strategy, much less international nuclear cooperation. Nuclear learning 
was slow, halting, and incomplete. he intensity of the ideological and 
political competition in the US-Soviet relationship was much greater than 
that between the United States and Russia or the United States and China 
today. here were far fewer positive strands of interdependence in the 
relationship. Yet the intensity of the zero-sum game did not prevent the 
development of rules of the road and cooperative agreements that helped 
to preserve the concurrent positive-sum game. 
hat is the good news. he bad news is that cyber technology gives much 
more power to nonstate actors than does nuclear technology, and the threats 
such actors pose are likely to increase. he transnational, multiactor games 
of the cyber domain pose a new set of questions about the meaning of 
national security. Some of the most important security responses must be 
national and unilateral, focused on hygiene, redundancy, and resilience. 
It is likely, however, that major governments will gradually discover that 
cooperation against the insecurity created by nonstate actors will require 
greater priority in attention. he world is a long distance from such a 
response at this stage in the development of cyber technology. But such 
responses did not occur until we approached the third decade of the nuclear 
era. With the World Wide Web only two decades old, may we be approach­
ing an analogous point in the political trajectory of cyber security? 
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